A Comprehensive Legal Analysis of Bail Provisions under the Sri Lankan Antiquities Ordinance I. Introduction The Antiquities Ordinance (Chapter 188) represents a foundational piece of legislation in Sri Lanka, specifically designed for the preservation of the nation's invaluable cultural heritage. Its overarching purpose, as articulated in its long title, which was notably replaced by the Antiquities (Amendment) Act, No. 24 of 1998, is "to provide for the better preservation of the antiquities of Sri Lanka, and of sites and buildings of historical or archaeological importance in Sri Lanka".1 This legislative emphasis underscores a profound commitment to safeguarding irreplaceable historical and archaeological assets for present and future generations. The Department of Archaeology, through its dedicated legal division, is entrusted with the critical responsibility of enforcing this Ordinance, which includes initiating legal proceedings against violators and proposing necessary amendments to the law to ensure its continued efficacy.3 This demonstrates the state's proactive and robust stance in protecting its heritage. The present inquiry delves into a critical procedural aspect of the Antiquities Ordinance: the availability of bail for individuals accused of offenses under its provisions. The specific questions raised seek clarity on whether bail is generally denied until the conclusion of the case, if any offenses are bailable, and whether a guilty plea alters the bail status. These are highly pertinent questions for legal practitioners and individuals navigating the complexities of this specialized area of criminal law. The perceived strictness of bail provisions for Antiquities Ordinance offenses reflects a profound legislative determination to deter crimes against national heritage. This approach is rooted in the understanding that the loss or damage to antiquities is often irreparable and unique. Unlike other forms of property, cultural artifacts, once stolen, damaged, or illegally excavated, frequently suffer irreversible harm or are permanently removed from the nation's heritage. This inherent vulnerability and the high value placed on cultural heritage logically necessitate stringent legal measures, including strict conditions concerning pre-trial detention, to deter potential offenders and ensure that those accused remain within the jurisdiction for the full course of justice. This indicates a deliberate policy choice to establish a powerful deterrent. This stringent approach to bail for offenses against antiquities can be understood as an application of the public trust doctrine within the realm of cultural heritage law. This doctrine posits that the state holds certain invaluable resources, including cultural heritage, in trust for the present and future generations of its citizens. The Supreme Court has invoked this doctrine in environmental protection cases, observing that "The State shall protect preserve and improve the environment for the benefit of the community".4 A similar jurisprudential philosophy underpins the state's robust measures against interference with antiquities. The denial of bail, therefore, serves as a strong affirmation of this duty, signaling that acts against this public trust are considered exceptionally grave. This connects the specific bail prohibition to a broader constitutional and jurisprudential principle of state responsibility for collective heritage, elevating the importance of these offenses beyond typical criminal acts. II. The General Framework of Bail in Sri Lanka Principles of the Bail Act No. 30 of 1997: "Grant of bail to be the guiding principle." The overarching legal framework governing bail in Sri Lanka is the Bail Act No. 30 of 1997.5 This Act fundamentally transformed the approach to pre-trial detention in the country. A cornerstone principle, explicitly articulated in Section 2 of the Bail Act, mandates that "the grant of bail shall be regarded as the rule and the refusal to grant bail as the exception".7 This principle embodies the legal system's commitment to individual liberty and the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. The Court of Appeal, in Dachchaini vs. The Attorney-General, unequivocally affirmed this policy, stating that "By the enactment of the Bail Act the policy in granting bail has undergone a major change. The rule is the grant of bail. The Rule upholds the values endorsed in human freedom. The exception is the refusal of bail and reasons should be given when refusing bail".9 The enactment of the Bail Act in 1997 marked a significant legislative shift towards a more rights-protective approach to pre-trial detention in Sri Lanka. This aligns the country's legal framework more closely with international human rights conventions, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which protect individual liberty and prevent unnecessary detention.6 This general trend towards upholding freedom makes any explicit statutory derogation from this principle, as found in the Antiquities Ordinance, particularly noteworthy and indicative of a strong, deliberate legislative intent. The repeated emphasis in the Bail Act on "grant of bail as the rule" 7 and its affirmation by the Court of Appeal 9, coupled with the introduction of anticipatory bail 6, clearly demonstrates a legislative commitment to minimizing pre-trial incarceration. This represents a modernization of Sri Lankan criminal procedure, moving away from potentially more restrictive historical practices. Therefore, when a specific statute, such as the Antiquities Ordinance, contains an explicit provision that overrides this general pro-bail stance, it underscores a very strong and intentional policy decision by the legislature, highlighting the exceptional nature and perceived gravity of the offenses covered by that specific law. Distinction between Bailable and Non-Bailable Offenses under the Bail Act The Bail Act establishes a crucial categorization of offenses into "bailable" and "non-bailable".6 For "bailable offenses," a person suspected or accused "shall... be entitled to be released on bail".7 In such instances, the officer-in-charge of a police station can release the suspect on a written undertaking within twenty-four hours, obviating the need to produce them before a Magistrate, unless there is a concern for public disquiet.7 Conversely, for "non-bailable offenses," release on bail is contingent upon the "discretion of the court".7 This discretion, however, is not unfettered and must be exercised judiciously, as emphasized by judicial precedent.9 A notable exception within the non-bailable category is that "No bail for an offence punishable with death except by a Judge of the High Court" 5, indicating a higher threshold for such grave offenses. Jurisdiction of Magistrate Courts and High Courts in Granting Bail Generally, Magistrate Courts possess the authority to grant bail for bailable offenses and can exercise discretion for non-bailable offenses, excluding those punishable by death or life imprisonment, which fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of a High Court Judge.6 Courts retain the power to refuse bail under specific circumstances, such as a credible belief that the suspect might abscond, interfere with witnesses or evidence, commit further offenses while on bail, or if the gravity of the alleged offense is likely to cause public disquiet.6 Crucially, the court is mandated to provide reasons for any refusal of bail.9 The Bail Act also introduced the concept of "anticipatory bail," allowing individuals who anticipate arrest for a non-bailable crime to apply for bail before being taken into custody.6 Section 3(1) of the Bail Act 7 explicitly lists specific statutes (like the Prevention of Terrorism Act) and a general category ("any other written law which makes express provision") as exceptions to its application. The statutes specifically mentioned in this context typically deal with offenses of extreme gravity, often impacting national security or public order. The fact that the Antiquities Ordinance includes an "express provision" that falls within this exceptional category suggests that the legislature views offenses against cultural heritage with a comparable level of national concern and gravity as those related to terrorism or public security. This implies a strong societal value placed on the protection of antiquities, elevating it to a status akin to national security. III. Bail Provisions under the Antiquities Ordinance Detailed Examination of Section 15C of the Antiquities (Amendment) Act, No. 24 of 1998 The Antiquities Ordinance (Chapter 188) underwent a significant legislative overhaul with the enactment of the Antiquities (Amendment) Act, No. 24 of 1998.1 This amending Act introduced several new sections, critically including Section 15C, which directly addresses the issue of bail for offenses committed under the Ordinance.2 Section 15C contains a clear and unambiguous prohibition: "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Code of Criminal Procedure Act, No. 15 of 1979 or any other written law, no person charged with, or accused of an offence under this Ordinance shall be released on bail".15 The phrase "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in... any other written law" is a powerful legislative drafting technique known as an "ouster clause." It explicitly ensures that Section 15C takes precedence over any conflicting general provisions for bail found in other statutes, including the Bail Act No. 30 of 1997, which effectively superseded the bail provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act. Interpretation of this Explicit Prohibition The language employed in Section 15C, particularly the absolute phrasing "no person... shall be released on bail," establishes an unequivocal statutory bar against granting bail for any offense committed under the Antiquities Ordinance. This means that, unlike many other non-bailable offenses where courts retain a degree of discretion, for offenses falling under this specific Ordinance, the judicial authority (including Magistrate's Courts) is legally mandated to refuse bail. The prohibition applies broadly to any individual "charged with, or accused of an offence under this Ordinance," encompassing suspects at various stages of the legal process, from initial police investigation to the formal laying of charges in court. The legislative decision to insert Section 15C in 1998 14 was a direct response to perceived inadequacies in deterring and prosecuting crimes related to antiquities. This "no bail" provision was likely intended to significantly strengthen enforcement by preventing suspects from absconding, interfering with crucial evidence, or committing further offenses while on release, given the unique and often irreversible nature of damage or loss to cultural heritage. The specific amendment in 1998 to introduce Section 15C suggests that prior to this, bail for Antiquities Ordinance offenses might have been governed by more general criminal procedure laws, potentially allowing for judicial discretion. The subsequent legislative action to explicitly prohibit bail indicates a parliamentary recognition that the existing legal framework was insufficient to effectively protect antiquities. The "no bail" clause acts as a stronger deterrent and ensures that accused individuals remain in custody, thereby making it more difficult for them to flee the jurisdiction or tamper with evidence, which is particularly critical when dealing with irreplaceable cultural artifacts. This demonstrates a clear cause-and-effect relationship: a perceived weakness in the previous enforcement mechanism led directly to the implementation of a stricter bail regime. The absolute nature of the bail prohibition under Section 15C places a substantial burden on the prosecution to ensure the swift investigation and trial of cases. Prolonged detention without trial, even if statutorily mandated, could potentially raise significant human rights concerns under Article 13(2) of the Constitution (which guarantees the right to be heard without undue delay) or Article 13(4) (presumption of innocence), even though the Bail Act itself is excluded. This inherent tension could lead to future constitutional challenges, as hinted by the reference to Article 13(2) in the legal discussions surrounding Section 15C.17 While Section 15C is unequivocally clear in its prohibition, the broader principles of fundamental rights, particularly the right to a speedy trial and protection against arbitrary detention, remain enshrined in the Constitution. If an individual is indefinitely remanded due to the bail prohibition in Section 15C, and their trial is subject to undue delays, it could be argued that their fundamental rights are being violated, irrespective of the Bail Act's non-applicability. This creates a significant legal tension between the specific protective legislation and overarching constitutional guarantees. Such a scenario could compel the Supreme Court to interpret the scope of Articles 13(2) and 13(4) in relation to statutory bail prohibitions, potentially leading to a nuanced jurisprudence where, while bail might not be granted, strict timelines for trials are imposed or other remedies are sought to prevent arbitrary or excessively long pre-trial detention. IV. Interaction between the Antiquities Ordinance and the Bail Act Analysis of Section 3(1) of the Bail Act Concerning Exceptions to its Applicability While the Bail Act No. 30 of 1997 establishes a general rule favoring the grant of bail, it deliberately incorporates specific exceptions to its applicability in Section 3(1).7 Section 3(1) explicitly states that the Bail Act "shall not apply to any person accused or suspected of having committed, or convicted of, an offence under... any other written law which makes express provision in respect of the release on bail of persons accused or suspected of having committed, or convicted of, offenses under such other written law".7 This clause is crucial for understanding the interplay between general and specific statutes concerning bail. How Section 15C of the Antiquities Ordinance Operates as a Specific Overriding Provision Section 15C of the Antiquities Ordinance 15, with its categorical declaration that "no person... shall be released on bail" for offenses under the Ordinance, precisely fits the description of an "express provision" as contemplated by Section 3(1) of the Bail Act. This means that the Antiquities Ordinance creates a specific, self-contained bail regime for its offenses. Consequently, the general principles, presumptions, and discretionary powers typically granted by the Bail Act do not extend to or apply when dealing with individuals suspected or accused of offenses under the Antiquities Ordinance. The specific, more stringent provision of the Antiquities Ordinance takes precedence and governs the matter. This interpretation has been judicially affirmed by the Court of Appeal in CA Writ 233-22, where it unequivocally stated: "Therefore, persons charged with or accused of offences under the Antiquities Ordinance falls within the 3rd category above. As a result, the provisions of the Bail Act do not apply to persons charged with or accused of offences under the Antiquities Ordinance".18 This judicial pronouncement provides definitive clarity on the statutory interaction. While the Bail Act broadly promotes individual liberty, its legislative design intentionally includes mechanisms for specific laws to impose stricter bail conditions. This is not a contradiction but rather a deliberate legislative choice to allow specialized statutes, particularly those addressing matters of significant public interest (such as national security or the preservation of cultural heritage), to override general procedural norms. The "notwithstanding" clause in Section 15C of the Antiquities Ordinance and the "express provision" clause in Section 3(1) of the Bail Act are perfectly harmonized to achieve this intended legislative effect. Superficially, the "no bail" provision of the Antiquities Ordinance appears to conflict with the general "bail as the rule" principle of the Bail Act. However, a deeper analysis of Section 3(1) of the Bail Act 7 reveals that the Bail Act itself anticipates and accommodates such specific legislative overrides. This is a built-in exception, demonstrating that the legislature consciously decided that certain types of offenses warrant a different, more restrictive approach to bail. This framework allows these specific laws to operate without creating a conflict of laws, and the Court of Appeal's ruling in 18 explicitly confirms this intended interaction and reconciliation. This legislative design, characterized by a general rule with specific statutory exceptions, reflects a common and sophisticated legal drafting technique employed to balance fundamental rights with compelling state interests. It suggests a precedent whereby future specialized legislation in Sri Lanka could similarly incorporate explicit bail prohibitions if the subject matter is deemed to be of overriding national importance. This could potentially lead to a more fragmented bail jurisprudence, where the default "rule" of bail is increasingly subject to specialized "exceptions" for particular categories of offenses. The manner in which the Bail Act and the Antiquities Ordinance interact establishes a significant precedent for the structure of future legislation in Sri Lanka. It illustrates that the Sri Lankan legal system is capable of, and does, create specific, overriding legal rules for certain domains, even when a general law already exists. This implies a potential trend where, for issues considered critically important (e.g., severe environmental crimes, complex financial fraud, or major public health crises), specialized legislation might bypass general procedural safeguards like bail. This could result in a more complex and nuanced bail landscape, where the general "rule" of bail becomes increasingly subject to highly specific and compelling "exceptions." V. Judicial Interpretation: Supreme Court and Court of Appeal Case Law Review of Key Supreme Court and Court of Appeal Judgments The most direct and authoritative judicial interpretation concerning Section 15C of the Antiquities Ordinance stems from the Court of Appeal in the case of CA Writ 233-22.18 In this pivotal judgment, the Court explicitly stated: "Similarly, the attention should be drawn to Section 15C of the Antiquities Ordinance which makes express provisions in respect of release on bail of persons charged with or accused of offences under the said Ordinance. Therefore, persons charged with or accused of offences under the Antiquities Ordinance falls within the 3rd category above. As a result, the provisions of the Bail Act do not apply to persons charged with or accused of offences under the Antiquities Ordinance." This ruling unequivocally confirms the non-bailable nature of offenses under the Antiquities Ordinance and the overriding effect of Section 15C. While other cases, such as Nithyanamhan and Others v. Attorney-General 19, discuss the broader principle of specific statutes overriding general bail provisions (in the context of the Prevention of Terrorism Act), and Dachchaini vs. The Attorney-General 9 elaborates on the general pro-bail policy of the Bail Act, CA Writ 233-22 18 stands as the direct and binding authority for the Antiquities Ordinance. It is important to note that a Supreme Court judgment from 2023 20 mentions a bail of Rs. 50,000.00 in an FR application, but the provided context does not indicate that this bail was granted for an Antiquities Ordinance offense. Without specific context, this reference cannot be used to infer bailability under the Antiquities Ordinance. Similarly, the Court of Appeal case PHC-0209-18 21 mentions an Antiquities Ordinance charge (Section 6) but primarily focuses on issues of confiscation and proper charging, rather than providing a direct ruling or interpretation of Section 15C concerning bail. The mention of Article 13(2) of the Constitution in relation to Section 15C and the Bail Act 17 in the legal literature indicates that the constitutional validity or implications of such a strict bail provision might be a subject of ongoing legal debate or potential future challenge, although no specific ruling on this constitutional aspect is provided in the available material. Discussion of how these judgments affirm the non-bailable nature The judicial pronouncement in CA Writ 233-22 18 is of paramount importance. It directly addresses the statutory interaction between the Bail Act and Section 15C of the Antiquities Ordinance, affirming that the latter's express prohibition on bail takes absolute precedence. This means that, from the perspective of judicial enforcement, the clear legislative intent to deny bail for these offenses is fully upheld and enforced by the courts. The consistent absence of Supreme Court or Court of Appeal judgments granting bail for Antiquities Ordinance offenses, despite the general pro-bail stance established by the Bail Act, further reinforces the strict judicial interpretation and application of Section 15C. The judiciary's consistent upholding of specific legislative overrides, even when they run counter to the general spirit of the Bail Act, demonstrates a strong principle of judicial deference to clear legislative intent. This is particularly evident when that intent is expressed through an explicit "notwithstanding" clause. This reinforces the legal maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali (a specific law overrides a general law). The Court of Appeal in CA Writ 233-22 18 did not attempt to find implicit loopholes or exceptions to Section 15C. Instead, it directly applied the plain wording of the statute and the exception clause in the Bail Act. This demonstrates a robust judicial commitment to upholding the explicit will of Parliament, even when it restricts a fundamental right such as liberty. This judicial stance signals to legal practitioners that arguments for bail based on the general principles of the Bail Act are highly unlikely to succeed when confronted with a specific, overriding statutory provision like Section 15C. While the current judicial stance is clear and consistent with statutory interpretation, the long-term implications of indefinite detention without bail, even if statutorily mandated, could potentially lead to more robust constitutional challenges. These challenges would likely be brought under Articles 13(2) (right to be heard without undue delay) and 13(4) (presumption of innocence) of the Constitution.17 Such arguments would contend that while the Bail Act might be excluded, the fundamental right to liberty and a speedy trial, as enshrined in the Constitution, cannot be entirely abrogated without due process or demonstrably exceptional circumstances. The current judicial interpretation 18 primarily focuses on the interaction between the specific statute and the general bail law. However, constitutional rights are supreme and form the bedrock of the legal system. If an individual is held indefinitely without bail due to the strictures of Section 15C, and their trial is subject to unreasonable delays, it could be argued that their fundamental constitutional rights are being violated, irrespective of the Bail Act's non-applicability. This situation could compel the Supreme Court to interpret the precise scope of Articles 13(2) and 13(4) in relation to such statutory bail prohibitions. This might lead to the development of a nuanced jurisprudence where, while bail itself may not be granted, strict timelines for the conclusion of trials are imposed, or other remedies are sought to prevent arbitrary or excessively prolonged pre-trial detention. Table 1: Summary of Key Case Law on Bail under Antiquities Ordinance Case Name Court Citation/Reference Relevant Statutory Provision(s) Key Finding/Principle on Bail CA Writ 233-22 Court of Appeal 18 Antiquities Ordinance, Section 15C; Bail Act, Section 3(1) Provisions of the Bail Act do not apply to persons charged under the Antiquities Ordinance due to Section 15C's express prohibition on bail. Nithyanamhan and Others v. Attorney-General Supreme Court 19 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act; Code of Criminal Procedure Act; Bail Act Discusses that specific statutes can bar bail where original courts have no jurisdiction, affirming that appellate powers cannot be invoked for such offenses. (Contextual) Dachchaini vs. The Attorney-General Court of Appeal 9 Bail Act, Section 2, Section 20(2) Affirms that the grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception under the Bail Act. Discusses bail pending appeal. (General Bail Act principles) PHC-0209-18 Court of Appeal 21 Antiquities Ordinance, Section 6; Forest Ordinance Mentions an Antiquities Ordinance charge but primarily focuses on confiscation and proper charging, not direct interpretation of bail under Section 15C. (Contextual) VI. Bail After Pleading Guilty under the Antiquities Ordinance Legal Analysis of Whether a Guilty Plea Alters the Bail Status Section 15C of the Antiquities Ordinance explicitly states: "no person charged with, or accused of an offence under this Ordinance shall be released on bail".15 The critical phraseology here is "charged with, or accused of." When an individual enters a plea of guilty, they are, in essence, admitting to the charge. However, their legal status as a person "accused of" the offense typically persists until a formal conviction is entered by the court and a sentence is pronounced. The plea itself is an admission, but the judicial process of adjudicating guilt and imposing a penalty still needs to be concluded. The Bail Act 7 generally refers to "suspected or accused" persons in its provisions concerning bail. While it does provide for bail pending appeal after a conviction 6, this provision applies after the judgment of conviction has been delivered, implying a change in status from "accused" to "convicted." Crucially, Section 15C of the Antiquities Ordinance does not contain any specific carve-out or exception that would allow for bail merely because a guilty plea has been entered. The explicit and absolute prohibition remains in full effect for anyone who continues to be "charged with, or accused of" an Antiquities Ordinance offense. Consideration of Procedural Implications and the Absence of Specific Statutory Exceptions for Guilty Pleas Given the stringent and absolute wording of Section 15C, a Magistrate's Court would, in all likelihood, interpret this provision to mean that even after a guilty plea, bail cannot be granted until the case has reached its full conclusion, which includes the pronouncement of sentencing. The legal status of being "accused" of the offense, for the purposes of bail, would be deemed to persist until the final judgment of conviction and the imposition of a sentence. The underlying purpose of the "no bail" clause in the Antiquities Ordinance is not solely to ensure the physical presence of the accused for trial but also, arguably, to prevent any potential interference with the ongoing legal process or to serve as an immediate consequence reflecting the gravity of the offense. A guilty plea addresses the need for a trial but does not necessarily negate all other risks (e.g., absconding before sentencing, or potential interference with other aspects of the investigation that might be relevant for sentencing). Therefore, based on the unambiguous statutory language of Section 15C and its confirmed judicial interpretation 18, a mere plea of guilty would not, in itself, create an entitlement to bail for an offense under the Antiquities Ordinance. The absolute nature of the bail prohibition in Section 15C implies that a guilty plea, while simplifying the factual determination, does not alter the fundamental legal status that triggers the bail restriction. This suggests that the legislative intent behind Section 15C extends beyond merely ensuring appearance for trial; it may also be intended to impose pre-sentencing detention as an immediate consequence or a further deterrent for offenses against antiquities, reflecting the severe view taken of such crimes. If the sole purpose of bail were to guarantee an accused person's presence for trial, then a guilty plea, by removing the need for a trial, could logically lead to the grant of bail. However, Section 15C's broad phrasing, "charged with, or accused of" 15, indicates a wider legislative intent. The absence of an explicit exception for a guilty plea implies that the prohibition extends beyond merely securing attendance for trial. It could be interpreted as a form of mandatory pre-sentencing detention, reflecting the gravity with which the legislature views these offenses, or as a measure to prevent any further interference with evidence or ongoing investigations that might still be pertinent for the sentencing phase. This strict interpretation means that legal counsel advising clients facing Antiquities Ordinance charges must clearly communicate that a guilty plea will not result in immediate release on bail. This could significantly influence plea bargaining strategies, potentially making defendants less inclined to plead guilty if pre-trial detention is guaranteed until sentencing, regardless of the plea. This, in turn, might inadvertently lead to more protracted trials, thereby increasing the burden on the judicial system. If admitting guilt does not lead to immediate release on bail, the incentive for an accused person to enter an early guilty plea is diminished, especially if they believe there is a chance of acquittal after a full trial or if they hope for a more lenient sentence. This scenario could result in a higher number of "not guilty" pleas, even in cases where the prosecution's evidence is strong, simply to prolong the legal process and potentially explore other avenues for release or a more favorable outcome. Such a development would inevitably increase the workload on Magistrate Courts and the Department of Archaeology, potentially leading to a slower overall pace of justice for these offenses. VII. Conclusion and Practical Implications Summary of Findings Regarding the Non-Bailable Nature of Offenses under the Antiquities Ordinance The comprehensive analysis confirms that, pursuant to Section 15C of the Antiquities (Amendment) Act, No. 24 of 1998, offenses committed under the Antiquities Ordinance are explicitly and absolutely non-bailable. This specific statutory provision unequivocally overrides the general principles of the Bail Act No. 30 of 1997, a fact further affirmed by Section 3(1) of the Bail Act itself and definitively established by judicial interpretation from the Court of Appeal in CA Writ 233-22.18 Consequently, the initial premise of the user's query is largely true: a suspect produced before a Magistrate's Court for an Antiquities Ordinance offense will, as a general rule, not be released on bail until the full conclusion of the case, including sentencing. There are no specific categories of offenses under the Antiquities Ordinance that are bailable, as the prohibition in Section 15C applies broadly to "an offence under this Ordinance." Furthermore, a plea of guilty does not alter the bail status for such offenses, as the statutory prohibition applies to persons who are "charged with, or accused of" the offense, a legal status that persists until the final judgment and sentencing are rendered. Implications for Suspects and Legal Practitioners in Magistrate Courts For Suspects: Individuals accused of offenses under the Antiquities Ordinance must anticipate mandatory pre-trial detention. This necessitates a thorough understanding of their legal rights and the procedural implications, as the usual avenues for obtaining bail are statutorily closed. For Legal Practitioners: Strategic Advice: Lawyers must provide clear and unequivocal advice to clients that bail is highly unlikely. The defense strategy must, therefore, pivot from securing pre-trial liberty to focusing on expediting the investigation and trial process, rigorously challenging the merits of the prosecution's case, or disputing the applicability of the Antiquities Ordinance itself (e.g., questioning whether the object in question legally qualifies as an "antiquity" under the law, as suggested by Section 15D concerning evidence 15). Constitutional Remedies: Given the statutory bar on bail, practitioners may need to explore avenues for fundamental rights applications (e.g., under Article 13 of the Constitution) in the Supreme Court. Such applications could be pursued if there are undue or unreasonable delays in the investigation or prosecution, arguing for a speedy trial or other remedies to mitigate prolonged detention, even if direct bail is statutorily barred. Plea Bargaining: The absence of the incentive of immediate release on bail following a guilty plea means that plea bargaining strategies must be meticulously re-evaluated. The traditional benefit of a guilty plea (expedited release) is removed, potentially influencing a defendant's willingness to admit guilt. The absolute denial of bail fundamentally alters the defense strategy for individuals accused under the Antiquities Ordinance. It shifts the primary focus from securing pre-trial liberty to either mounting a robust challenge against the charges or pursuing constitutional remedies to address excessive detention. This creates a high-stakes environment for both the accused and their legal counsel. When bail is not an option, the accused and their legal team are deprived of a critical tool for managing the pre-trial phase of a criminal case. This means that the immediate objective shifts from temporary release to either outright acquittal or minimizing the duration of detention. This necessitates a more aggressive and immediate engagement with the merits of the case, or a strategic pivot to higher constitutional courts if delays become unreasonable, thereby fundamentally changing the dynamics of the defense strategy. Recommendations for Legal Strategy in Such Cases Expedite Proceedings: Legal counsel should actively and vigorously advocate for the speedy conclusion of police investigations and the prompt commencement of judicial proceedings. Challenge Prima Facie Case: A primary focus should be on challenging the prosecution's prima facie case, including the essential elements of the offense and, critically, the legal classification of the object as an "antiquity".15 Monitor Detention Period: It is imperative to closely monitor the duration of detention. Prolonged detention, even in the absence of bail, could potentially open avenues for constitutional challenges regarding fundamental rights to liberty and a speedy trial. Explore Alternative Remedies: Practitioners should thoroughly investigate and explore any other available procedural or constitutional remedies to address the conditions or duration of the accused's detention. The stringent nature of Section 15C, while primarily aimed at protecting irreplaceable national heritage, raises important questions regarding proportionality and the delicate balance between compelling state interests and individual liberty, particularly in cases involving minor antiquity offenses or prolonged trials. This inherent tension could potentially fuel future policy debates concerning amendments to the Ordinance, possibly to introduce some form of judicial discretion or statutory time limits for detention, even within the non-bailable framework, to ensure closer alignment with evolving international human rights standards. While the current legal framework is clear, the absolute nature of the bail prohibition could lead to situations where the principle of proportionality is challenged. For instance, a relatively minor offense under the Antiquities Ordinance might still result in indefinite detention, which could be perceived as disproportionate to the alleged crime. This could spark a public or legal debate about whether judicial discretion should be introduced (e.g., for specific low-level offenses, or after a certain period of detention) to prevent potential human rights concerns, even while maintaining the overall protective intent of the Ordinance. This is a forward-looking implication, suggesting potential areas for legal reform and jurisprudential development. Table 2: Comparison of Bail Rules: General vs. Antiquities Ordinance Aspect of Bail General Bail Act (No. 30 of 1997) Rule Antiquities Ordinance (Chapter 188) Rule Statutory Basis Guiding Principle Bail is the rule, refusal is the exception. No person charged with, or accused of an offense under this Ordinance shall be released on bail. BA s.2 7; AO s.15C 15 Bailable Offenses Right to be released on bail. No bailable offenses under this Ordinance; all offenses are non-bailable in effect. BA s.4 7; AO s.15C 15 Non-Bailable Offenses Discretionary bail by the court, except for death penalty offenses (High Court only). No bail for non-bailable offenses; absolute prohibition. BA s.5, s.13 5; AO s.15C 15 Bail after Guilty Plea Bail possible pending appeal after conviction. Pre-conviction status typically "accused." Guilty plea does not alter bail status; detention continues until final judgment/sentencing. BA s.20 6; AO s.15C 15 Statutory Basis for Exclusion Act does not apply to laws with "express provision" for bail. Section 15C is an "express provision" overriding general bail laws. BA s.3(1) 7; AO s.15C 15 Works cited Antiquities (Amendment) Act (No. 24 of 1998) - Sect 2, accessed August 19, 2025, https://www.commonlii.org/lk/legis/num_act/aa24o1998280/s2.html Antiquities Ordinance - Laws of Sri Lanka, accessed August 19, 2025, https://www.srilankalaw.lk/revised-statutes/alphabetical-list-of-statutes/48-antiquities-ordinance.html Law - Department of Archaeology, Sri Lanka, accessed August 19, 2025, https://archaeology.gov.lk/index.php/about/sections/law scfr4590817062010.pdf Bail Act (No. 30 of 1997), accessed August 19, 2025, https://www.commonlii.org/lk/legis/num_act/ba30o199787/ Bail Act In Sri Lanka | How To Get Bail In Sri Lanka, accessed August 19, 2025, https://kaluthanthrilegal.com/bail-act-in-sri-lanka/ Bail - LawNet, accessed August 19, 2025, http://www.lawnet.gov.lk/wp-content/uploads/Law%20Site/4-stats_1956_2006/set5/1997Y0V0C30A.html Bail Act - Laws of Sri Lanka, accessed August 19, 2025, https://www.srilankalaw.lk/b/80-bail-act.html Sri Lanka Law Reports (2005) 2 Sri LR DACHCHAINI VS THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, accessed August 19, 2025, https://lankalaw.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/029-SLLR-SLLR-2005-V-2-DACHCHAINI-vs-THE-ATTORNEY-GENERAL.pdf Bail 16 12 2012 final (3).rtf an outlook - SlideShare, accessed August 19, 2025, https://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/bail-16-12-2012-final-3rtf-an-outlook-37975241/37975241 Bail Act (No. 30 of 1997) - Sect 6, accessed August 19, 2025, https://www.commonlii.org/lk/legis/num_act/ba30o199787/s6.html induction handbook for - junior lawyers - Bar Association of Sri Lanka, accessed August 19, 2025, https://basl.lk/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Induction-Handbook-for-Junior-Lawyers_compressed-1.pdf Bail Act (No. 30 of 1997) - Sect 14, accessed August 19, 2025, https://www.commonlii.org/lk/legis/num_act/ba30o199787/s14.html Antiquities (Amendment) - LawNet, accessed August 19, 2025, http://www.lawnet.gov.lk/wp-content/uploads/Law%20Site/4-stats_1956_2006/set5/1998Y0V0C24A.html vostitute, accessed August 19, 2025, https://www.hindudept.gov.lk/web/images/pdf/A-Antiquity_(Amendment)_Act_No_24_of_1998.pdf Antiquities (Amendment) Act (No. 24 of 1998) - Sect 4, accessed August 19, 2025, https://www.commonlii.org/lk/legis/num_act/aa24o1998280/s4.html Law Report part 10.docx - LawNet, accessed August 19, 2025, http://www.lawnet.gov.lk/wp-content/uploads/NewSLLR/word/Low%20Report%20Vol.%201%20(2011)/Law%20Report%20part%2010.docx IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA Marasinghage Premasiri 358/B, Kotugodella Road, Galage, accessed August 19, 2025, https://courtofappeal.lk/?melsta_doc_download=1&doc_id=5d72cf64-f489-4bca-99bb-962dcb5132d6&filename=ca%20writ%20233-22.pdf NITHYANANTHAN AND OTHERS v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL - Lanka Law, accessed August 19, 2025, https://lankalaw.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/024-SLLR-SLLR-1983-2-NITHAYANTHAN-AND-OTHERS-v.-ATTORNEY-GENERAL.pdf Supreme Court Judgements Cover - 2023 - Lanka Law, accessed August 19, 2025, https://lankalaw.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Supreme-Court-Judgements-2023.pdf IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA In the matter of an Appeal under Article 154P and 138 o, accessed August 19, 2025, https://courtofappeal.lk/?melsta_doc_download=1&doc_id=0830dbb7-7153-4236-b5ca-faeb1ecaaf79&filename=PHC-0209-18%20Final%20Judgement.pdf.pdf

 

The Evolving Landscape of Witness and Document Filing in Sri Lankan Civil Procedure: A Comprehensive Analysis of Statutory Requirements, Judicial Discretion, and Recent Reforms

Executive Summary

The efficient management of evidence is a cornerstone of fair and expeditious civil litigation. In Sri Lanka, the filing of witness and document lists in civil actions has historically been governed by strict timelines, notably the requirement to file these lists at least 15 days before the trial. Failure to comply with this stipulation has significant consequences, with the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) providing for exceptions only under "special circumstances" as outlined in Section 175. This report provides a comprehensive analysis of these procedural requirements, examining their traditional application, the judicial interpretation of "special circumstances," and the transformative impact of the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, No. 29 of 2023. The recent amendments introduce a fundamental shift from a trial-centric to a pre-trial conference-centric approach, emphasizing early disclosure and active judicial case management. This report aims to offer up-to-date guidance for legal professionals navigating these evolving procedural requirements, highlighting the critical changes and their implications for practice.

Introduction: Overview of Witness and Document Management in Sri Lankan Civil Procedure

In the realm of civil litigation in Sri Lanka, the systematic presentation of evidence is paramount to achieving a just resolution. The Civil Procedure Code (CPC) establishes a structured framework for parties to disclose the evidence they intend to rely upon, primarily through the filing of witness and document lists. This procedural requirement serves multiple vital functions: it ensures that all parties are adequately informed of the evidence to be presented, thereby preventing trial by ambush; it facilitates thorough preparation for cross-examination and rebuttal; and it contributes to the overall efficiency and expedition of judicial proceedings.

However, the application of these procedural rules often involves a delicate balance between strict adherence to prescribed timelines and the court's inherent duty to ascertain the truth and prevent any miscarriage of justice. Historically, the CPC has mandated specific deadlines for filing these lists, with penalties for non-compliance. Yet, it also provides a crucial safety valve: the court's discretion to permit the introduction of unlisted evidence under "special circumstances." The interplay between these strictures and the exercise of judicial discretion forms a complex area of civil procedure. This report delves into the specifics of these provisions, particularly Section 121 and Section 175 of the CPC, and critically examines the profound changes introduced by recent legislative amendments, which have significantly reshaped the landscape of evidence management in Sri Lankan civil actions.

The Traditional Framework: Sections 121 and 175 of the Civil Procedure Code (Pre-2023 Amendments)

The Mandatory 15-Day Rule for Filing Witness and Document Lists

Prior to the enactment of the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, No. 29 of 2023, the procedural obligation for parties to disclose their intended evidence was primarily enshrined in Section 121(2) of the Civil Procedure Code. This section explicitly mandated that " at the trial, and (b) a list of the documents which they propose to read in evidence at the trial".1 The intent behind this provision was clear: to ensure transparency and fairness in the litigation process by providing all parties with ample notice of the evidence to be adduced. This advance disclosure was designed to prevent tactical surprises at trial, enable opposing parties to prepare their responses effectively, and ultimately contribute to a more streamlined and efficient trial process.

The interpretation of the phrase "date fixed for the trial" within Section 121(2) became a critical point of judicial scrutiny. While the wording might, at first glance, suggest any date on which the trial was scheduled to commence, the Supreme Court consistently clarified that this referred unequivocally to the first date fixed for trial. This definitive interpretation was articulated in cases such as Salih v. Hemawathie 3 Sri LR 91, where it was held that Section 121(2) "requires the parties to file their list of witnesses and documents before the first date fixed for trial".3 This position was further reinforced in more recent Supreme Court rulings, such as SC/APPEAL/1 (

Niyakulage Dilruk Sanjeewa Fernando v. Diyagama Vidanelage Somawathie Perera & Meddakandage Anilka Rohini Perera), which confirmed that lists "must be filed at least 15 days before the first date fixed for trial, not just before any trial date".5 This strict construction of the deadline was essential to prevent parties from exploiting postponements to delay disclosure, which would undermine the very purpose of the rule. If the deadline were to shift with every rescheduled trial date, it would create an environment ripe for procedural manipulation, allowing parties to hold back crucial evidence until a late stage, thereby unfairly disadvantaging the opposing side who would have already structured their case based on the initially disclosed evidence. This judicial clarification thus solidified the legislative intent to promote procedural certainty and efficiency from the earliest possible stage of trial preparation.

Consequences of Non-Compliance with the 15-Day Rule

Under this traditional framework, the failure to comply with the 15-day rule carried significant repercussions. Generally, if a witness's name was not included in the duly filed list, that witness could not be examined at trial. Similarly, any document not described in the list would not be received in evidence.2 This strict adherence to the rule was vital for maintaining the integrity and predictability of the trial process.

However, this procedural rigidity was not absolute. The Civil Procedure Code recognized that unforeseen circumstances or genuine oversights could occur, and a blanket exclusion of evidence might, in certain situations, lead to an unjust outcome. To mitigate such potential injustices, the CPC provided a crucial exception: the court retained the power to permit the examination of an unlisted witness or the reception of an unlisted document "without the leave of the court" under "special circumstances" as provided by Section 175.2 The existence of this discretionary power within Section 175 served as a necessary counterbalance to the strict disclosure requirements. While the rule itself encouraged diligence and early preparation, the exception acknowledged that procedural rules should ultimately serve the ends of justice. A rigid application without any room for flexibility could inadvertently lead to the exclusion of vital evidence, potentially distorting the true facts of the case and compromising the fairness of the final judgment. Thus, Section 175 acted as a judicial safety valve, allowing courts to balance the need for procedural regularity and efficiency with the paramount objective of achieving substantive justice.

Judicial Interpretation of "Special Circumstances" under Section 175

Evolution of Section 175

The scope and application of Section 175 of the Civil Procedure Code have evolved over time. Initially, Section 175 primarily addressed the calling of unlisted witnesses, allowing it when the court was of the opinion that "special circumstances" rendered such a course advisable in the interests of justice.3 A significant amendment occurred with the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, No. 20 of 1977. This Act renumbered the existing Section 175 as subsection (1) and introduced a new subsection (2). Section 175(2) specifically extended the "leave of the court" provision to documents, stating: "A document which is required to be included in the list of documents filed in court by a party as provided by section 121 and which is not so included shall not, without the leave of the court, be received in evidence at the trial of the action".7 This amendment formalized the court's discretion over unlisted documents, mirroring the existing power over unlisted witnesses.

Principles Governing Court Discretion

The granting of leave under Section 175(2) is a matter "eminently within the discretion of the trial Judge".8 This discretion, while broad, is not unfettered; it must be exercised judiciously and in accordance with established legal principles. The fundamental principle guiding this discretion is that procedural law should serve as a means to facilitate justice and the ascertainment of truth, rather than acting as an impediment. The Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that procedural rules should not obstruct the fair determination of a case.5 This means that while non-compliance is generally discouraged, the court retains the power to overlook a procedural lapse if doing so is essential for a just outcome.

Factors Considered by Courts for Granting Leave

Courts, in exercising their discretion under Section 175, consider a range of factors to determine if "special circumstances" warrant the admission of unlisted evidence. These factors, articulated in landmark judgments such as Kandiah v. Wisvanathan 1 Sri L.R. 269 (cited in Salih v. Hemawathie), include:

• Interests of Justice: The paramount consideration is whether admitting the unlisted witness or document is necessary to achieve a just and equitable resolution of the dispute. The court assesses whether excluding the evidence would lead to a substantial injustice.8

• Ascertainment of Truth: The court evaluates whether the evidence is crucial for uncovering the true facts of the case and arriving at a correct decision. If the unlisted evidence is indispensable for a complete understanding of the matter, its admission may be favored.8

• Authenticity of Documents: Where the authenticity of a document is not in doubt, such as certified copies of public records or judicial proceedings, courts are generally more inclined to grant leave. The absence of a genuine dispute over the document's veracity reduces the potential for prejudice to the opposing party.8

• Sufficient Reasons for Failure to List: The party seeking leave must provide a compelling and credible explanation for their failure to include the witness or document in the initial list. This could include situations where the party was genuinely unaware of the document's existence at the time of filing, or where the relevance of the evidence only became apparent at a later stage due to developments in the case.3 The concept of "sufficient reasons" is not a mere formality; it demands a qualitative assessment by the court. It requires the party to demonstrate a lack of negligence or a genuine inability to comply with the rule within the prescribed timeframe. For instance, evidence newly discovered despite diligent efforts, or evidence that became critically relevant only after an unexpected turn in the opposing party's arguments, might be considered "sufficient reasons." Conversely, a simple oversight, a lack of diligence in preparing the case, or a deliberate strategic delay to gain an unfair advantage would typically not be deemed "sufficient reasons." The court meticulously evaluates the good faith and diligence of the party seeking the indulgence, along with the broader impact on the fairness of the proceedings for all litigants.

• Prejudice to Opposing Party: A critical factor is whether granting leave would cause a "distinct disadvantage" or "grave prejudice" to the opposing party.2 The principle of a fair trial dictates that parties should not be ambushed by new evidence at a late stage, especially after they have closed their case or formulated their defense based on the evidence disclosed. If admitting the unlisted evidence would necessitate reopening the case, conducting new investigations, or fundamentally altering the opposing party's strategy, it creates an unfair playing field. The court's discretion aims to prevent such procedural unfairness, prioritizing the integrity of the trial process and the right to a fair hearing for all parties. The prejudice considered is not merely an inconvenience, but a substantial impairment of the ability to effectively respond to the new evidence.

• Mitigation through Costs: In instances where a document is admitted despite late listing, the court may impose an appropriate order for costs against the defaulting party. This serves as a compensatory mechanism to alleviate any minor hardship or inconvenience caused to the other party.8

Analysis of Landmark Case Law

The application of Section 175 and its interplay with Section 121(2) has been illuminated by several key judicial pronouncements:

• Abdul Munaf v. Mohamed Yusuf (1997): This case underscored the strict interpretation of the 15-day rule. The defendant-petitioner had filed a witness list significantly past the deadline, after the plaintiff-respondent had already closed their case on the fourth trial date. Crucially, no explanation was provided for this delay.2 The District Judge refused to permit the unlisted witness, and this decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal. The appellate court emphasized the unexplained delay and the substantial prejudice caused to the plaintiff-respondent, who had concluded their case without knowledge of this new evidence. The judgment also clarified that the precedent from
  Girantha v. Maria, which the defendant-petitioner sought to rely upon, was inapplicable as it interpreted a repealed Section 121 that did not contain the specific 15-day filing requirement.2 This case firmly established that unexplained delay and resulting prejudice are strong grounds for refusing leave, reinforcing the importance of adhering to the statutory timelines.

• Salih v. Hemawathie (2002): In this case, the plaintiff sought to introduce documents via a second additional list just 14 days before the third date fixed for trial. The court reiterated that the 15-day rule applied to the first date fixed for trial, not subsequent dates. Leave to produce the document was refused because the plaintiff failed to provide a "sufficient reason" for the delay in listing it earlier.3 This judgment further solidified the "first date fixed for trial" interpretation and highlighted the necessity for parties to provide concrete, justifiable reasons for any omission, even if Section 175(2) does not explicitly define "special circumstances."

• Kandiah v. Wisvanathan (1991): While not directly a case on the 15-day rule, this judgment, cited in Salih v. Hemawathie, is pivotal for its articulation of the factors guiding judicial discretion under Section 175(2) for unlisted documents. The court laid down the principles of "interests of justice," "ascertainment of truth," "authenticity of documents," and the requirement of "sufficient reasons" for the omission, while also emphasizing the avoidance of "distinct disadvantage" to the opposing party.8 This case provided the substantive criteria for evaluating "special circumstances," moving the assessment beyond mere procedural compliance to a more equitable consideration of justice.

The Transformative Impact of the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, No. 29 of 2023

The Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, No. 29 of 2023, certified on November 17, 2023, marks a pivotal moment in Sri Lankan civil procedure. This Act introduces a comprehensive overhaul, particularly impacting case management and the disclosure of evidence.9

Introduction of the Pre-Trial Conference Regime

A cornerstone of the 2023 amendments is the introduction of a mandatory pre-trial conference system. The Act repeals and replaces Chapter XA (which dealt with fixing the day of trial) and Chapter XVIIA (which previously covered pre-trial hearings), establishing a new, more structured pre-trial process.12 Under the new Section 79A, the court is now mandated to appoint a date for the pre-trial conference not less than three months and not exceeding five months from the date of filing the answer or replication.12 This shift from a trial-centric to a pre-trial conference-centric procedural timeline signifies a fundamental change in judicial philosophy. The new regime actively promotes proactive judicial case management, moving away from a reactive approach where issues and evidence are primarily addressed at the trial itself. The pre-trial conference, as outlined in Section 142A, is designed to facilitate settlement, expedite the disposition of actions, improve trial quality through prior preparation, identify key issues early to discourage unnecessary pre-trial applications, and facilitate evidence discovery.12 This front-loading of the evidence management process aims to significantly reduce "law's delays" 8 by compelling parties to prepare thoroughly and disclose evidence much earlier in the litigation cycle.

New Requirements for Filing Witness and Document Lists (Section 79B)

In line with this new pre-trial regime, the previous Section 121(2), which stipulated the 15-day rule before trial, has been repealed.12 Its requirements are now superseded by a new Section 79B. This new section mandates that parties must tender to the court registry,

not less than thirty days before the first fixed date for the pre-trial conference, their proposed admissions and issues, lists of witnesses to be called at trial, lists of documents relied upon, and copies of documents in their possession or control. Proof of service to other parties is also required.12 This change represents a critical adjustment in the timing and stage of evidence disclosure, moving it significantly earlier in the overall litigation process.

Provisions for Electronic Documents (Section 79C)

A notable modernization introduced by the 2023 Act is the detailed framework for handling electronic documents under Section 79C. This section explicitly defines "document" to include electronic forms and sets out specific procedures for their tendering, overriding provisions in other acts.12 Parties intending to tender electronic documents must file a list and copies of such documents not less than thirty days before the pre-trial conference. Critically, the opposing party is granted the right to apply, within fifteen days of receiving notice, to access and inspect not only the electronic documents themselves but also the generating

machine, device, computer, or information system and any related records.12 Failure to provide such access or to comply with court orders regarding electronic documents will result in the party not being permitted to tender them as evidence. Furthermore, any objections to the admissibility of electronic documents must be filed in writing with reasons, either before or at the pre-trial conference.12 This vital modernization step acknowledges the pervasive nature of digital information in contemporary disputes. It aims to ensure the integrity and authenticity of electronic evidence, which can be easily altered or misinterpreted without proper context (such as metadata or the source device). However, it also introduces complexities related to data volume, the technical expertise required for inspection, and potential privacy concerns, along with the possibility of disputes over the scope of "reasonable opportunity" for access. This section thus attempts to provide a robust framework for managing complex digital evidence, promoting transparency and fairness in the digital age.

Court's Discretion to Permit Additional Witnesses and Documents at Pre-Trial (Section 142D)

The concept of judicial discretion to admit unlisted evidence continues under the new regime, albeit at an earlier stage. Section 142D explicitly empowers the court, specifically the pre-trial Judge, to grant permission to a party to call any witness or produce any document at the trial, even if not included in the initial Section 79B list, provided these items are identified as relevant to the dispute.12 The pre-trial Judge also has the authority to award costs against the party seeking to tender such unlisted items, unless "sufficient reasons" for the omission are provided.12 This legislative change effectively shifts the point of critical assessment for unlisted evidence from the trial stage to the pre-trial conference. Instead of a last-minute application at trial, parties are now expected to address any omissions or newly discovered evidence during the pre-trial conference. This aligns with the overarching goal of front-loading case management and minimizing surprises during the actual trial. The established principles and factors for exercising discretion, such as "sufficient reasons" and "prejudice," previously applied under Section 175 (as guided by

Kandiah v. Wisvanathan and Abdul Munaf), are highly likely to continue informing the pre-trial Judge's decision-making under Section 142D, ensuring consistency in the judicial application of these equitable considerations.

Amended Role of Section 175 in the Post-2023 Landscape

While Section 121(2) has been repealed, Section 175 of the CPC has not been abolished but rather amended to align with the new pre-trial regime. It now refers to Section 79B for initial listing requirements and Section 142D for the permission to call unlisted witnesses or produce unlisted documents.12 Furthermore, a new subsection (3) has been added to Section 175, which mandates that any order made under Section 175 shall take into consideration any order made under Section 142B (which pertains to pre-trial orders).12 This amendment ensures that the traditional "leave of court" mechanism, which has a substantial body of case law interpreting "special circumstances," remains relevant. However, its application is now explicitly integrated with and influenced by the new pre-trial management process. By requiring consideration of Section 142B orders, the CPC ensures that decisions made during the pre-trial conference regarding evidence admissibility are respected and form part of the basis for any subsequent application under Section 175 at the trial stage. This approach maintains continuity in the legal framework while effectively adapting it to the new, more proactive procedural flow.

Transitional Provisions: Application to Pending Actions

A crucial aspect for legal practitioners is the presence of transitional provisions within Act No. 29 of 2023. These provisions stipulate that actions and matters filed in District Courts and pending immediately before the Act's commencement (November 17, 2023), where a pre-trial hearing date was already fixed or any pre-trial step was taken under the repealed Chapter XVIIA, shall continue to be dealt with under the repealed provisions.12 This creates a period of dual procedural regimes. Legal practitioners must, therefore, diligently ascertain the date of institution and the precise stage of proceedings for each case to correctly determine which set of rules—the pre-2023 or post-2023 amendments—applies. This avoids disruption to ongoing litigation but introduces a layer of complexity, demanding careful attention to the specific procedural history of every case to prevent misapplication of legal provisions and potentially adverse outcomes.

Table 1: Evolution of Key Provisions for Witness and Document Filing in Sri Lankan Civil Procedure

Feature	Pre-Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, No. 29 of 2023	Post-Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, No. 29 of 2023
Primary Statutory Basis	Section 121(2) and Section 175(1), (2) CPC	Section 79B, Section 79C, Section 142D, and amended Section 175 CPC
Filing Deadline	Not less than 15 days before the first date fixed for trial 1	Not less than 30 days before the first fixed date for the pre-trial conference 12
Filing Stage	Before trial	Before pre-trial conference
Electronic Documents	Not explicitly addressed in detail	Explicitly defined and subject to specific filing, access, and inspection requirements (Section 79C) 12
Leave for Unlisted Items	Granted by court at trial under Section 175(1) for witnesses and 175(2) for documents, under "special circumstances" 2	Primarily granted by the pre-trial Judge at the pre-trial conference under Section 142D, for "relevant" items, with "sufficient reasons" for omission 12
Judicial Discretion Reference	Section 175(1) and (2)	Section 142D, with Section 175(3) requiring consideration of Section 142B orders 12
Governing Principle	Strict adherence to deadlines, but discretion to prevent injustice	Early disclosure, proactive case management, and discretion to prevent injustice
Relevant Case Law (Illustrative)	Abdul Munaf v. Mohamed Yusuf, Salih v. Hemawathie, Kandiah v. Wisvanathan 2	Principles from older case law on "sufficient reasons" and "prejudice" likely to be applied to new sections like 142D. Recent Supreme Court rulings (e.g., SC/APPEAL/1) confirm court's general approach to discretion.5

This table provides a concise, side-by-side comparison of the procedural frameworks before and after the 2023 amendments. It directly addresses the user's initial query regarding the "15 days before the trial" rule by illustrating its replacement and the new timeline. For legal practitioners, this table serves as an immediate reference guide to discern which rules apply based on the case's initiation date and its current procedural stage. It highlights the shift in the point of initial discretion (from the trial judge to the pre-trial judge), the expanded scope of covered evidence (including electronic documents), and the overall acceleration of the disclosure timeline. This visual representation underscores the significant impact of the recent reforms and aids in preventing the misapplication of repealed provisions.

Table 2: Judicial Factors for Granting Leave to File Additional Witnesses/Documents (Under Section 175 / New Section 142D)

Factor	Description
Interests of Justice	Is the admission of the unlisted evidence essential to ensure a fair and just outcome in the case? Would its exclusion lead to a substantial injustice? 8
Ascertainment of Truth	Is the evidence crucial for uncovering the true facts of the case and enabling the court to arrive at a correct decision? Is it indispensable for a complete understanding of the dispute? 8
Authenticity of Documents	Is there any doubt regarding the genuineness or veracity of the document? Courts are more inclined to grant leave for documents whose authenticity is undisputed (e.g., certified public records). 8
Sufficient Reasons for Omission	Has the party provided a credible, compelling, and justifiable explanation for their failure to include the witness or document in the initial list? This requires demonstrating diligence and good faith, not mere oversight or tactical delay. 3
Prejudice to Opposing Party	Would the admission of the unlisted evidence cause a "distinct disadvantage" or "grave prejudice" to the opposing party? This involves assessing whether it would lead to an unfair surprise, necessitate reopening the case, or fundamentally alter the opposing party's strategy. 2
Mitigation through Costs	Can any minor hardship or inconvenience caused to the opposing party by the late admission be adequately compensated through an appropriate order for costs? 8

This table serves as a practical guide for legal professionals and judicial officers alike, outlining the substantive criteria that courts consider when deciding whether to grant leave for the introduction of unlisted evidence. These factors, derived from established case law under the former Section 175, are expected to continue guiding judicial discretion under the new Section 142D. The consistent application of these principles ensures that while procedural rules promote efficiency, they do not inadvertently become barriers to the equitable resolution of disputes.

Conclusion

The landscape of witness and document filing in Sri Lankan civil actions has undergone a significant transformation with the enactment of the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, No. 29 of 2023. The traditional 15-day rule for filing lists before trial, once a central pillar of evidence management, has been replaced by a new requirement to file these lists not less than 30 days before the first fixed pre-trial conference. This fundamental shift underscores a broader legislative intent to move towards a more proactive and judicially managed civil litigation process, aiming to streamline proceedings, reduce delays, and foster earlier dispute resolution.

While the specific timelines and procedural stages have changed, the underlying principle of judicial discretion to admit unlisted evidence under "special circumstances" remains a vital component of the legal framework. The new Section 142D now explicitly empowers the pre-trial Judge to exercise this discretion, guided by established judicial principles such as the interests of justice, the ascertainment of truth, the authenticity of the evidence, the sufficiency of reasons for omission, and critically, the potential for prejudice to the opposing party. The amendments to Section 175 ensure its continued relevance, integrating it with the new pre-trial orders.

The integration of detailed provisions for electronic documents further modernizes the CPC, reflecting the increasing prevalence of digital evidence and emphasizing the need for robust procedures for its disclosure, access, and authentication. However, the transitional provisions of the Act necessitate careful attention from legal practitioners, as cases initiated before the amendments may still be governed by the older rules, creating a dual procedural environment for a period.

In essence, the recent reforms represent a concerted effort to enhance the efficiency and fairness of civil litigation in Sri Lanka. For legal professionals, this necessitates a thorough understanding of the new timelines, the expanded scope of disclosure (especially for electronic evidence), and the continued, albeit re-contextualized, importance of judicial discretion in managing evidence. Navigating this evolving landscape effectively will be crucial for ensuring diligent representation and contributing to the effective administration of justice.

Works cited

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3. 91 SALIH v HEMAWATHIE Held: - Lanka Law, accessed August 18, 2025, https://lankalaw.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/013-SLLR-SLLR-2004-V-3-SALIH-v.-HEMAWATHIE.pdf

4. SC/APPEAL/1/2025 - IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA, accessed August 18, 2025, https://supremecourt.lk/?melsta_doc_download=1&doc_id=1cbfa593-43bb-4c8f-a8b6-fb4caedc7943&filename=sc_appeal_1_2025.pdf

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6. Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act (No. 79 of 1988) - Sect 52, accessed August 18, 2025, https://www.commonlii.org/lk/legis/num_act/cpca79o1988316/s52.html

7. Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Law (No. 20 of 1977) - Sect 31, accessed August 18, 2025, https://www.commonlii.org/lk/legis/num_act/cpcl20o1977328/s31.html

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